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THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
OF AMERICAN SANCTIONS  
Sanctions against rogue international actors tend 
to work best when they are widely supported. 
When they are decided by the UN, they are 
expected to be universally respected. Sanctions 
against Russia linked to the Ukraine crisis work 
well as long as they are supported by both the 
US and the EU.1 
But when, on 8 May 2018, the United States 
decided to withdraw from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and re-
impose sanctions on Iran, their move was purely 
unilateral. It was even strongly opposed by the 
EU and other UN members, who continue to 
consider that the JCPOA is the best instrument 
possible to prevent a resumption of the Iranian 
nuclear programme.  
The fact that the JCPOA is rooted in a UN 
Security Council Resolution makes their position 
even stronger.2 The International Atomic 
Energy Agency has certified Iran’s compliance 
with its obligations at no less than thirteen 
different occasions. Even the head of the CIA 
said in January 2019 that Tehran was abiding by 
the agreement.  
Nevertheless, European companies and citizens 
are obliged to respect the US sanctions if they 
do not want to be sanctioned themselves. The 
extra-territorial application of the US law 
‘We Europeans cannot accept that a foreign power – 
even our closest friend and ally – makes decisions over 
our legitimate trade with another country. This is a basic 
element of sovereignty…’ (Federica Mogherini)1 
 
The decision by the United States to 
withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on 
Iran broke an international understanding, 
sanctioned by a UN Security Council 
Resolution. However, European and other 
non-US companies dealing with Iran must 
abide by US law in order to avoid its extra-
territorial effects on their US operations. 
Efforts are being made to help the EU keep 
its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when 
there is disagreement with the US, but until 
now these have not accomplished much. 
Therefore a new Instrument in Support of 
Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched 
at the end of January to ensure the 
continuation of some trade with Iran. But 
the only convincing way to allow the EU to 
increase its autonomy is to boost the role of 
the Euro in international transactions. 
Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, 
we need more than ever to address the issue 
of the extraterritorial application of 
American sanctions – today it is Iran, what 
if tomorrow it is China? 
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ensures that any company or individual, world-
wide, can be punished through their links with 
the jurisdiction of the United States, such as 
dollar transactions or the existence of an 
American subsidiary.3 
THE BLOCKING STATUTE 
The extra-territorial imposition of American 
sanctions became a topic of dispute between the 
US and the EU as early as 1996, with the 
“Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act”, 
better known as the Helms–Burton Act, which 
extended the territorial application of the US 
embargo to foreign companies trading with 
Cuba. At the time, the EU was trying to 
improve its relations with the island, and agreed 
on legislation which would circumvent the US 
sanctions, the so-called “blocking statute”. 
The statute allows EU operators to recover 
damages arising from the extra-territorial 
sanctions “from the persons causing them” and 
nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign 
court ruling based on them. Moreover, it forbids 
EU persons from complying with those 
sanctions, unless exceptionally authorised to do 
so by the Commission. 
As could be expected, the first reaction by the 
EU after the US reinstated the Iran sanctions 
consisted in updating the Blocking Statute by 
making it applicable to the new extra-territorial 
US sanctions on Iran. This was done on 6 
August 2018, the day the first of the two sets of 
American sanctions entered into force.  
The core weakness of the blocking statute is that 
it was never really used. In particular, the 
guidelines on the way to proceed were not very 
clear. For example, it is very difficult for the EU 
authorities to prove that the reason why a 
company discontinues its activities in Iran is 
linked to the American sanctions, and not based 
on economic reasons or changes in its industrial 
strategy. 
Large European companies that are very active 
in Iran, such as Total and Peugeot, have decided 
early on that they would comply with the US 
sanctions. They were followed by Airbus, 
Siemens and Swift, the international financial 
transactions platform which had been part of 
the EU sanctions against Iran since 2012 but 
had re-started its connections with Iranian banks 
after the conclusion of the JCPOA. The 
imposition of the blocking statute regulation in 
fact results in European companies, including 
the European subsidiaries of US companies, 
navigating potentially conflicting legal 
obligations. At the end of the day they do not 
have much of a choice but to comply with the 
US law rather than the EU regulation. 
THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 
Another suggestion coming from the EU 
Commission was to use the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) as a vehicle to ensure 
that projects in Iran would continue to be 
financed. As liquidity is a major problem in Iran, 
the objective would have been to enable the EIB 
to support small and medium-size companies in 
Iran, helping them offset the impact of US 
sanctions.  
However, the Bank, which is supposed to 
mobilise private capital in order to finance 
projects of public interest, did not wish to take 
this risky path. EIB president Werner Hoyer 
told the press on July 18 that “the European 
Investment Bank would risk its business model 
if it invested in Iran”. He insisted that he 
supported the EU position on Iran, but also 
regretted the EIB could not play an active role, 
as long as the financing flows were the way they 
are. 
THE SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE 
On the occasion of the UN General Assembly 
week in September 2018, officials from the 
countries having negotiated the JCPOA, minus 
the US, issued a statement welcoming “the 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
3 
 
initiative to establish a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) to facilitate payments related to Iran’s 
exports, including oil, and imports, which will 
assist and reassure economic operators pursuing 
legitimate business with Iran”.4 France, the UK 
and Germany, with help from the European 
Commission and the EEAS, started in 
September 2018 to elaborate the SPV. The 
discussions, long and difficult, were finally 
concluded at the end of January 2019, with the 
creation of a new institution called INSTEX – 
short for Instrument in Support of Trade 
Exchanges – aimed at facilitating “legitimate” 
trade between European economic operators 
and Iran. 
INSTEX will function as a form of barter 
arrangement: a Euro-denominated clearing 
house allowing a European exporter of goods to 
Iran to be paid by a European importer of 
goods from Iran. The payments will thus remain 
outside the reach of US control over global 
money-transfer systems. It also avoids the need 
to rely on banks that fear being cut off from 
doing business in US financial markets. The 
company was registered by the “E 3” in Paris on 
January 29, with an initial €3,000 in capital and a 
supervisory board with members from the three 
countries and chaired (for the first 6 months) by 
Per Fischer from Germany. It received the 
formal endorsement of all 28 EU members on 
January 31 and will become operational after 
Iran will have created its local counterpart.  
According to a statement by the E 3 foreign 
ministers, INSTEX will “focus initially on the 
sectors most essential to the Iranian population 
– such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices and 
agri-food goods”.5 This restriction – notably the 
absence of oil and petroleum products – seems 
to have been a deliberate decision aimed at 
avoiding a harsh reaction from the U.S. The 
scope of the instrument is provisionally 
restricted to the EU-28. However, the three 
founders stated that INSTEX must aim “in the 
long term” to be open to economic operators 
from third countries who wish to trade with 
Iran. 
A REINFORCED ROLE FOR THE EURO? 
The INSTEX was conceived in a prudent way, 
with limited objectives, at least at this stage. It is 
more of a symbolic gesture, showing Iran that 
the Europeans are prepared to do their part to 
save the JCPOA. But it does not solve the 
broader problem of re-establishing European 
sovereignty over its trade policy. This is why the 
European Commission has started to address 
the main reason why the US is able to control 
most international transactions: the mere fact 
that the majority of them, even when they only 
involve European companies, use the United 
States Dollar. 
In December 2018, on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the creation of the Euro, the 
Commission issued a communication entitled 
“Towards a stronger international role of the 
Euro”.6 It opens a discussion on the way to 
overcome the (numerous) technical obstacles in 
having the Euro used more broadly in financial 
transactions. It recalls that the share of the Euro 
in global payments in the world amounts to 36% 
compared with 40% for the US Dollar, but that 
the US Dollar’s share of the world’s foreign 
exchange reserves still amounts to 60% as 
compared to 20% for the Euro.  
The communication is not a direct answer to the 
“sovereignty” issue. However, it does mention 
the benefits of a stronger international role for 
the Euro: “Stronger autonomy of European 
consumers and businesses, allowing them to pay 
or receive payments for their international trade, 
and finance themselves with reduced exposure 
to legal actions taken by third country 
jurisdictions, like extraterritorial sanctions”.  
AN ORDER IMPOSED BY A ‘SUPERIOR 
POWER’ 
The Iran case gave new arguments to the EU 
and other UN members, in the name of their 
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own sovereignty, “to call into question the 
practice that the United States has taken upon 
itself to make decisions for the rest of the 
world”.7 More and more unilateral sanctions are 
decided by Washington alone, without 
consultation of the EU or any other partner, but 
are then also imposed on non-US companies 
under the threat of huge fines. Recently, Société 
Générale agreed to pay $1.34 billion for the 
settlement of an action by OFAC for violations 
of US sanctions targeting Cuba, Iran, and 
Sudan.8 The violation of American sanctions 
against Iran was also a major factor motivating 
the US request to Canada to arrest and extradite 
Huawei’s chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. 
In a recent article on “American Hegemony”, 
Harvard professor Joseph Nye quotes the well-
known neo-conservative theorist Robert Kagan, 
who stated that “a liberal world order, like any 
world order, is something that is imposed, and 
as much as we in the West might wish it to be 
imposed by superior virtue, it is generally 
imposed by superior power”. Yet only the 
United States, adds Nye, “has tried to develop 
foreign policies that reflect such exceptionalism 
and has had the scope conferred by sufficient 
power to take an original path in the 
international jungle”.9 
The security protection provided by the US and 
ensured by the Atlantic Alliance and our 
common attachment to universal values and the 
multilateral system have for a long time made it 
possible for the Europeans to accept this 
“exceptionalism”. But the Iran case is probably a 
step too far. If the American administration 
does not hesitate to conduct a foreign policy 
which we consider contrary to our interests – if 
Iran today, why not China tomorrow? – it might 
be important that we claim back the sovereignty 
we were willing to share with the US during the 
cold war. 
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